Writing a Legal Memorandum for the CP:CLA with Leanne the Lawyer
snEK IZ - Memorandum
Mémorandum: Un slam fait dans un style de récit de conte sur fond musical "zinli" et Agbadja" des rythmes locaux de mon pays le Bénin (ex Danhomey).c'est un ...
Hi Chase, here you go (one paragraph at a time): Under Washington, D.C.
law, is Defendant Matt Keegan liable for Plaintiff Amy Marino’s injuries
under a theory of negligence when he suddenly lost control of his car and
crashed into a tree during a narcoleptic episode, but he has successfully
controlled his narcolepsy with medication for the past several years, and
his last narcoleptic episode was over three years ago?
Here, like the defendant in Cohen v. Petty, Defendant Keegan was in good
health at the time of the accident, and had never before fallen asleep
while driving. Plaintiff Marino may argue that the present case is
distinguishable because unlike in Cohen v. Petty, Keegan has a history of
narcolepsy. Marino may argue, therefore, that Keegan should have known that
he might suffer a narcoleptic episode while driving.
This rule of law comes from Cohen v. Petty, in which the Court of Appeals
of the District of Columbia held that a defendant whose passengers were
injured in a car crash caused by the defendant’s sudden fainting was not
chargeable with negligence when he had never fainted before and was in good
health at the time of the accident. [cite].
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But Keegan has successfully controlled his narcolepsy for the past several
years with medication, and his last narcoleptic episode was over three
years ago. Thus, he had no reason to think that he might suffer another
narcoleptic episode on the day of the accident.
In Washington, D.C., a driver who is suddenly stricken by an illness that
renders it impossible for him to control the car, and which he had no
reason to anticipate would occur while driving, is not chargeable with
negligence. [cite].
The court reasoned that under those facts, the defendant did not know and
had no reason to think that he might become ill while driving, and that he
should therefore not be held responsible for the plaintiffs’ injuries.
[cite].